rommelbanlaoi

JOSE RIZAL, THE SPRATLY DISPUTES AND PHILIPPINES-CHINA RELATIONS

Rommel Banlaoi — Sun, 19 Jun 2011 09:36:27 +0000

by Rommel C. Banlaoi

As we celebrate the 150^th birthday anniversary of Dr. Jose Rizal, our national hero whom Leon Ma. Guerrero describes as the “First Filipino”, the Philippines is beset with a sovereignty challenge in a complex maritime dispute over some territories in the South China Sea (now called by the Philippine government as West Philippine Sea).

The South China Sea, where Rizal navigated during his trip to Spain, is composed of two major groups of islands: the Paracels and the Spratlys. The Philippines is enmeshed in a troubled dispute in the Spratlys where the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or Freedom Island is situated.

The name KIG does not only represent the Filipino freedom that Rizal advocated during his lifetime. It also symbolizes the freedom of navigation that Rizal enjoyed during his long cruises to Europe. These two freedoms are now under threat because of renewed security tensions in the South China Sea.

One major source of this security tension is the growing assertiveness, if not aggressiveness, of China to pursue what it calls its “undisputable” ownership of the entire South China Sea. Because China believes that the South China Sea is part of its internal lake, it puts the Philippines and China in a troubled relationship.

Jose Rizal is inevitably involved in the Spratly disputes and Philippines-China relations.

First, one of the occupied Philippine territory in the KIG is named after him – the Rizal Reef.

Otherwise known as the Commodore Reef, the Rizal Reef is approximately 200 nautical miles from the Northwest of Puerto Princesa, Palawan and closest to the Palawan municipality of Balabac. The Rizal Reef has a total land area of 3.7 hectares if not submerged under water during high tide.

The Rizal Reef is one of the richest areas in the Spratlys in terms of marine biodiversity. Its coral reef formation can be classified as an atoll because of a reef system surrounding a lagoon. When I visited Rizal Reef in May 2009, coral reefs were still well-preserved and enormously beautiful like a magical rainforest under the sea.

Like the multi-talented Jose Rizal, the Rizal Reef has diverse marine resources like different species and varieties of fish, sea grass, shells, and water organisms. If Jose Rizal is our national hero who fought for our national freedom, Rizal Reef can also be declared as a national marine sanctuary to preserve its marine richness and to promote its freedom from threats of environmental destruction.

Jose Rizal also provides a strong link in Philippines-China Relations.

Jose Rizal is a Chinese-Filipino who inspired many nationalists around the world, including Sun Yat Sen, the founding father of Republican China. Jose Rizal is a Filipino with Chinese ancestors who serve as testaments to long-standing interactions and friendships between the Philippines and China.

To recognize Rizal’s ancestral roots in China and to symbolize China’s close relations with the Philippines, a Rizal Monument is in fact constructed in Jinjiang Municipality of Fujian, China. This monument is the tallest Rizal Monument in the world. It is six meters taller than the Rizal Monument in Luneta, Manila. There are currently 10 Rizal Monuments outside the Philippines.

In other words, Jose Rizal has already left an indelible ink in Spratly dispute and symbolic link in Philippines-China relations.

But if there is something the Philippines and China can learn from Jose Rizal, it is his commitment to peace and non-use of violence.

The commemoration of 150^th birthday of Jose Rizal is therefore a stern reminder to Philippines and China of their long-standing friendship. The life and ideas of Jose Rizal are also strong reminders to both the Philippines and China that in the midst of their differences on the Spratly disputes, the path to peace is always a noble option.

The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience in the Southern Philippines

Rommel Banlaoi — Thu, 12 May 2011 07:21:21 +0000

by Rommel C. Banlaoi

Since the launching of the global war on terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Philippines has been engaged in a prolonged military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Key ASG leaders have been killed in this battle, while others have been imprisoned for various crimes associated with terrorism. Despite these successes, authorities have not been able to eliminate the ASG completely, and the group remains a threat to Philippine internal security. Even after losing key field commanders, the ASG is still able to replenish its membership primarily from affected and influenced villages in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi (BASULTA) in the southern Philippines.

After providing a brief background of the ASG, this article examines the sources of the ASG’s resilience in the face of government and international pressure. It argues that the ASG is a product of complex tensions in the southern Philippines, where criminal, political and militant groups at times collaborate to achieve shared goals. It also shows the limits of countering terrorism in the southern Philippines.

A Deeper Look at the Founding of the ASG

Analysts traditionally trace the evolution of the ASG to Abdurajak Janjalani, who reportedly founded the group in the early 1990s. While there is no doubt that the ASG’s original ideological foundation is attributed to the political and religious ideas of Abdurajak, what he actually organized was a group called al-Harakatul al-Islamiyyah (AHAI) or the Islamic Movement, whose original members were drawn from his followers in Jamaa Tableegh, an Islamic propagation group that he formed in Basilan in the early 1980s.[1] Abdurajak officially declared the creation of AHAI in 1989 to pursue Jihad Fi Sabilillah, defined as “fighting and dying for the cause of Islam.”[2] Yet it was only in 1993 when AHAI formally organized with Abdurajak as the amir.[3]

Since the formal launch of AHAI in 1989, Abdurajak delivered several khutbahs or sermons and released several fatawa using the nom-de-guerre “Abu Sayyaf,” in honor of Afghan resistance fighter Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.[4] While Abdurajak idolized this Afghan leader, the suggestion that Abdurajak was an Afghan war veteran is still a subject for verification.[5] Some living Filipino Afghan war veterans, for example, have challenged the claim that Abdurajak actually fought in the Afghan war—arguing instead that it was his younger brother, Hector, who participated in the conflict.[6]

Abdurajak’s khutbahs and fatawa became popular not only in Basilan but also in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga City. His popularity caught the ire of police and military authorities because Abdurajak was associated with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a group that declared jihad against the Philippine government. Since Abdurajak used the pen name “Abu Sayyaf,” the military described his followers as a group of Abu Sayyaf, which was popularized in media as the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG. The popularity of this group spread widely in Mindanao and was locally known as Juma’a Abu Sayyaf. In August 1991, Abdurajak publicly used the name ASG in connection with the bombing of the MV Doulos, a Christian missionary ship docked at the Zamboanga City port.[7]

From Islamic Movement to a Bandit Group

From an Islamic movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ASG received the label of a bandit group from the Philippine government for partaking in several bombing, extortion and kidnap-for-ransom activities. Although the ASG received initial funding from al-Qa`ida in the mid-1990s through the activities of Muhammad Jamal Khalifah, external funding was cut off when Philippine authorities discovered Khalifah’s clandestine operations in the country.[8]

To mobilize resources, the ASG resorted to a kidnap-for-ransom spree in the late 1990s. The ASG’s most publicized kidnap-for-ransom activities were the March 2000 attacks in elementary schools in Basilan,[9] the April 2000 attack at the Sipadan resort of Malaysia[10] and the May 2001 attack at the Dos Palmas resort of Palawan.[11] These attacks prompted the Philippine government to describe the ASG as a group of bandits interested in money-making through kidnapping activities. As a result of limited foreign funding since 9/11, the ASG has relied on kidnapping activities as its major source of funding—this continues today.[12] Other sources of its funding come from extortion activities (disguised as zakat, or alms giving), counterfeiting of goods, illegal drug sales or serving as bodyguards for local politicians.[13]

From a Bandit Group to a Terrorist Group

The aftermath of 9/11, however, resulted in the redesignation of the ASG from a bandit group to a terrorist group. The United States listed the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization, justifying the deployment of U.S. troops to the southern Philippines to assist and train the Philippine military in countering the threat. Since 9/11, the ASG has engaged in a series of terrorist activities such as the Davao International Airport bombing in March 2003 that killed 21 people, the Superferry 14 bombing in February 2004 that killed 116 people and the Valentine’s Day bombing in February 2005 that killed 20 people.[14] During this period, the ASG engaged in several bombing activities that were hallmarks of terrorism rather than banditry.[15]

ASG’s bomb-making skills were acquired through joint training with Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives in the southern Philippines. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, alleged masterminds of the 2002 Bali bombing, have been identified by Philippine intelligence authorities as key trainers of the ASG on the manufacture and use of improvised explosive devices.[16] Dulmatin and Umar Patek trained some ASG members with members of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

From Terrorist Group to Bandit Group Again

When the Philippine military waged Oplan Ultimatum in August 2006 as a counterterrorism offensive to eliminate the ASG, it led to the demise of key ASG leaders, particularly Khadaffy Janjalani and Jainal Antel Sali, Jr. (also known as Abu Solaiman). The success of Oplan Ultimatum led to the drastic decline of ASG membership to an estimated 200 members at the conclusion of the campaign in 2007.[17]

Yet the ASG was able to recover its membership when it mounted a series of kidnapping activities in 2008. This allowed the group to amass money, which attracted Muslim youth to join the spree. The massive kidnapping activities of the ASG started in June 2008 with the abduction of well-known Filipina journalist, Ces Drilon, and her cameraman. This was followed by the kidnappings of three workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in January 2009 and two Chinese nationals in November 2009.[18] In between those dates, several local residents were kidnapped, with one local teacher in Jolo beheaded in November 2009. Indeed, the ASG degenerated into a bandit group again.

With money in their pockets resulting from several ransom payments, the ASG was able to accommodate younger recruits not interested in ideology, but in guns and money. Muslim parents in impoverished villages of BASULTA even volunteered their sons to join the ASG in exchange for a monthly supply of rice and financial support to the family of around $200.[19] Some fathers even reportedly traded their sons for guns.[20] There were cases where young recruits joined the ASG as a status symbol against ordinary gangs in their communities. Some entered the ASG as a result of “pot” (marijuana) sessions with members.[21] There are a few who joined the ASG to exact revenge for the deaths of their loved ones killed by police or military forces. There are also members who joined the ASG due to clan conflicts (known as rido), which is prevalent in Mindanao.[22]

Sources of ASG Resilience

As of April 2010, the ASG has an estimated 445 members, 79% of whom are 30-years-old and younger.[23] According to the Philippine government, Sulu represents the largest membership of 200 followed by 130 in Basilan, 90 in Zamboanga City, 20 in Tawi-Tawi and five in Marawi City.[24] The ASG has become a resilient group because it is able to replenish its membership from affected and influenced villages in BASULTA through material inducements. In Sulu alone, 46% or 115 of its total 251 villages are affected by the ASG.[25] In Basilan, 25% of its 187 villages are affected by ASG.[26] In other words, the ASG has a reservoir of new recruits that provide the group its staying power.

Aside from this reservoir, ASG leaders have also mastered the skills of conniving with ordinary criminal groups in their operational areas to mount kidnapping and other criminal activities. The ASG has recognized field commanders who are known bandits in the community. ASG commander Alpader Parad, who was killed in February 2010, was a known kidnapper rather than an ideological leader in Sulu. Other field commanders of the ASG are also leaders of notorious criminal gangs in BASULTA who are engaged in piracy, arms smuggling, drugs trafficking and counterfeiting of goods.

Furthermore, some ASG field commanders are protected by local politicians who also benefit from the illegal activities of the group—using ASG members as part of their private militias.[27] Although the Philippine government has established a commission to dismantle private armies, it remains to be seen if the commission can fulfill its mandate. According to the Philippine National Police, there are more than 130 private armies in the entire country, in addition to rebel groups moonlighting as partisan armed militias of local politicians.[28] ASG members who are not part of the private army of a local politician offer their services as “thugs for hire,” particularly during election seasons.

In other words, the ASG has become an entrepreneur of violence with more of its members interested in pursuing money rather than a violent, Islamist ideology. While other commanders still have the illusion of waging jihad to establish an Islamic state in the southern Philippines, these individuals are a minority, usually those who studied in Islamic schools in the Philippines and abroad. Individuals such as Yasser Igasan, Khair Mundos and Isnilon Hapilon fit the description of ideological leaders. Yet Igasan, who is the nominal amir of the ASG, remains a jihadist but lacks loyal armed followers to promote his mission. Mundos, who is leading the ASG in Basilan, also lacks followers who are committed jihadists. Most of Mundos’ followers are bandits who are not interested in pursuing jihad. Hapilon, who is leading some of the group in Sulu, is overpowered by other ASG field commanders who are more interested in money generation. In short, the majority of ASG members are not motivated by the promise of an Islamic state or the virtue of jihad, but by the allure of money and power that comes from the barrel of a gun.

The ASG, therefore, has become a resilient group because its existence is enmeshed in a complex situation in the southern Philippines where rebels and terrorists connive with ordinary bandits, who collude with local politicians. All these various interests perpetrate violence on an island marred by more than 400 years of ethnic conflict, banditry and rebellion.

Limits of Countering Terrorism in the Philippines

With this grim reality of violence in the southern Philippines, counterterrorism measures largely based on the use of military muscle will not put an end to the ASG. Military offensives and other variants of Oplan Ultimatum can kill ASG members, but not end the ASG as a resilient group.

The ASG is a symbol of the complexities of armed violence in the southern Philippines that interact with issues of banditry, terrorism, rebellion, separatism, clan conflict, ethnic conflict and warlordism. The continuous entry of foreign jihadists to the southern Philippines only compounds these issues, as radical foreigners subvert the minds of the locals, imbuing them with a violent Islamist ideology. Moreover, they also train local fighters in sophisticated bomb-making skills. Only effective governance can limit ethnic conflict, banditry and rebellion. A strong civilian government sincere in nation-building is needed to finally put an end to the ASG by resolving the ethnic and political disputes plaguing the region.

Rommel C. Banlaoi is the Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, an independent think-tank. He is the author of Philippine Security in the Age of Terror (2010), Counter-Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They (2009) and War on Terrorism In Southeast Asia (2004). He is currently working on a book project on the Abu Sayyaf Group.

[1] For a more detailed history, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group and Terrorism in the Southern Philippines Seven Years After 9/11: Threat and Response,” Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, September 2008.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Personal interview, Noor Muog, former member of the Abu Sayyaf Group, April 8, 2010.

[6] There is need to conduct research on the life and stories of Filipino Muslim veterans of the Afghan war. Some have died, some have been imprisoned but there are still remaining veterans all over Mindanao. There are a few staying in Muslim communities in Manila trying to make a living peacefully.

[7] “Abu Sayyaf Kidnappings, Bombings and Other Attacks,” GMANews.tv, August 23, 2007.

[8] The discovery is fully described in the report, “The Islamic Fundamentalist/Extremist Movements in the Philippines and their Links with International Terrorist Organizations,” December 1994, produced by the Special Investigation Group-Intelligence Command of the Philippine National Police headed by Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr.

[9] For an excellent account, see Jose Torres Jr., Into the Mountains: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001).

[10] For first-hand accounts of this incident, see Roberto N. Aventajado, 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf (Pasig City: Anvil, 2004) and Werner Wallert, Hostage Terror: Abducted by the Abu Sayyaf (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2009).

[11] For a gripping account of her tragedy in this attack, see Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2003).

[12] Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr., “The Evolution of Terrorist Financing in the Philippines,” presented at the International Conference in Countering the Financing of Terrorism at the Sulu Hotel, Philippines on July 7-8, 2008; Personal interview, Major General Benjamin Dolorfino, Commander of the Western Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, March 25, 2010.

[13] Personal interview, Rear Admiral Alexander Pama, Commander of Naval Forces Western Mindanao of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, March 24, 2010.

[14] For details on these attacks, see Enrico Antonio La Vina and Lilita Balane, “Timeline: The Abu Sayyaf Atrocities,” Newsbreak Online, March 31, 2009.

[15] For detailed analysis, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism,” in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Salazar eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 247-264.

[16] Dulmatin was killed in Indonesia on March 9, 2010. Umar Patek is believed to have left the Philippines, but there are reports that he is still in Jolo, Sulu in the southern Philippines.

[17] Rodolfo B. Mendoza, “Updates on Terrorist Organizations in the Philippines,” lecture delivered at the Brunei Darussalam Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, December 3, 2009.

[18] “Teacher Beheaded in Philippines,” BBC, November 9, 2009.

[19] Personal interview, senior intelligence officer, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, March 25, 2010.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Wilfredo Magno Torres III ed., Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao (Makati City: The Asia Foundation, 2007).

[23] Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Evolving Threats of Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” lecture presented at the 4th Asia Pacific Program for Senior National Security Officers organized by the Center for Excellence in National Security, Singapore, April 13, 2010. For the estimates on ASG cadre, see Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Armed Forces of the Philippines, March 2010.

[24] Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Armed Forces of the Philippines, March 2010.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Local politicians allegedly received commissions from ransom payments and proceeds from illicit trafficking of arms and drugs. This idea was also articulated by National Security Adviser and Acting Defense Secretary Norberto Gonzales. Also see Jocelyn Uy, “Abu Sayyaf Men Maybe Moonlighting at Private Armies—Defense Execs,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 15, 2010.

[28] Jesus A. Versosa, “The PNP’s Role in Upholding the Law Against Private Armed Groups,” Philippine National Police, January 27, 2010.

(Originally published at CTC Sentinel on 3 May 2010. Original piece can be accessed at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-sources-of-the-abu-sayyaf’s-resilience-in-the-southern-philippines)

Bin Laden’s Ideology Lives On

Rommel Banlaoi — Fri, 06 May 2011 03:22:21 +0000

ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED in NEWSBREAK ON MAY 2, 2011 |

Source: http://www.newsbreak.ph/2011/05/02/bin-laden’s-ideology-lives-on/

By ROMMEL BANLAOI

As a terrorist group, Al Qaeda is a resilient global organization whose life does not depend on the life of its leaders.

MANILA, Philippines – Osama bin Laden’s confirmed death is a great blow to Al Qaeda and its purported followers worldwide.

But bin Laden is not the only person who founded Al Qaeda and masterminded many terrorist attacks, including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the twin tower in New York City.

Bin Laden is the strong persona of a violent extremist ideology of Al Qaedaism that declares war against what it calls the “infidel” United States. He personifies the idea of contemporary Wahhabism, a Salafi brand of Islam. Some of its followers espouse violent jihad that can take the form of what is popularly known as terrorism.

US President Barrack Obama describes the death of bin Laden as “the most significant achievement to date” in defeating al Qaeda. President Obama stressed that “his demise should be welcomed by all who believe in peace and human dignity.”

While the world celebrates the death of bin Laden, there are followers who mourn the loss of their idol and global leader. These followers have the intent and capability to pursue retaliatory attacks to avenge the death of their global icon. President Obama even admits that bin Laden’s death “does not mark the end” of global counter-terrorism efforts and that “al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks”. Thus, President Obama underscored ,“we must and we will remain vigilant at home and abroad.”

It is currently argued that Al Qaeda’s Number Two man, Ayman al-Zawahri, will likely take the place of bin Laden.

Egyptian in origin, al-Zawahri is a surgeon in profession who adheres to militant Islamic jihad and is willing to continue the fight of bin Laden. Thus, the end of Bin Laden does not mean the end of Al Qaeda and the ideology.

Osama bin Laden is dead! But what’s in it for the Philippines?

Weakened link

It is already a public knowledge that the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has been linked with Al-Qaeda. In the 1990s, bin Laden sent to the Philippines his brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, to establish this link. Since the launching of the global war on terrorism in 2001, in which the Philippines was loosely labeled as the “second front,” this link is believed to have been weakened but not totally eliminated.

Khalifa founded in the late early 1990s the now defunct Islamic School, the Darul Imam Shafee (DIS), which trained more than 100 Muslim militants in the Philippines. Most of his students have joined the ASG.

Yassir Igasan, the rumored Amir of ASG based now in Sulu, was trained by Khalifa in DIS. Igasan upholds the Wahhabi ideology of bin Laden whose death will surely have enormous emotional impact on him and his few Muslim followers in the Mindanao. These followers have the intent and capability to mount retaliatory attacks, which the Philippine law enforcement authorities should prevent.

As a terrorist group, Al Qaeda is a resilient global organization whose life does not depend on the life of its leaders. Its complex network of relationships with other likeminded organizations worldwide provides the life support for Al Qaeda.

As a resilient terrorist organization, Al Qaeda learns not only from its mistakes and setbacks but also from its achievements and victories.

Bin Laden is dead. But the ideology of Al Qaedaism that he founded lives on. This ideology, in fact, has already immortalized him even before he was killed. This ideology is considered omniscient by believers, and this ideological omniscience provides the resilience of Al Qaeda.

With the death of Bin Laden, there is no doubt that Al Qaeda will never be the same.

But Al Qaeda has the capacity to innovate like other international terrorist organizations.

To keep the organization alive despite the setback of bin Laden’s death, Al Qaeda will now study how to move on in a post-bin Laden era.

Without bin Laden, Al Qaeda can still actively operate as the clandestine network he established has not been totally eliminated. Al Qaeda can even mutate into a new form that can change the nature of contemporary global terrorist threats.

The Philippines, being affected by the threat of Al Qaeda, can join the whole world in celebrating the death of a man that gave terrorism a new face. At the same time, there are a few Moros who mourn the death of what they call their global ideological beacon.

The challenge to Philippine law enforcement authorities is to prevent those who mourn from translating their remorse into actual terrorist attacks.

The author is the Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) and author of the book, Philippine Security in the Age of Terror published in 2010 by CRC Press/Taylor and Francis, New York City.

Remembering 2004 Super Ferry 14 Bombing: World’s Deadliest Maritime Terrorist Attack, So Far

Rommel Banlaoi — Sat, 19 Feb 2011 10:46:38 +0000

Rommel Banlaoi

Not known to many Filipinos, the world’s deadliest maritime terrorist attack occurred in the Philippines five years ago in Manila Bay.

On 27 February 2004, just days after the commemoration of People Power Uprising in 1986, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) bombed the Super Ferry 14 carrying 900 overloaded passengers. The bombing instantly caused the death of 116 persons and the injury of more than 300 others.

The Super Ferry 14 bombing has been described as the world’s most lethal terrorist attack at sea. It made the ferry a floating inferno – a tragic incident that placed the Philippines again in the world’s security radar. It was also watershed event as it demonstrated ASG’s maritime terrorist capability – something that was previously downplayed by Philippine law enforcement authorities.

The Philippine government initially declared the Super Ferry 14 blast as a mere accident, notwithstanding the bold admission of the ASG who claimed responsibility for the bombing. But the Philippine Board of Marine Inquiry that investigated the incident eventually confirmed that the blast was indeed the handiwork of the ASG.

Redento Cain Dellosa, a Muslim convert and member of the ASG-linked Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), confessed to have planted the bomb onto the said ferry. Using a name Arnulfo Alvarado listed as passenger 51, Dellosa is currently in Bicutan Jail having been accused of that crime.

Maritime terrorism is inherent in the capability of ASG.

Most ASG members and followers belong to Muslim families and communities of fishermen with a century-old seafaring tradition. Because ASG members live close to the waters of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (BASULTA), they have gained tremendous familiarity of the maritime environment. If the truth be known, most Muslim Filipinos living in coastal communities are experienced divers. ASG members’ deep knowledge of the maritime domain gives them ample capability to mount maritime terrorist attacks.

ASG’s first terrorist attack was, in fact, maritime in nature.

On 24 August 1991, the ASG bombed the M/V Doulous, a Christian missionary ship and a European floating library docked at the Zamboanga port. According to Abdurajak Janjalani, the bombing of M/V Doulous was a reaction of the group to the continuing military offensive against Muslims in the Southern Philippines. Janjalani even warned of more future violence to match if not surpass the violence inflicted by the Philippine military on the Muslim people.

But the Philippine government was regrettably clueless of the built-in maritime terrorist capability of the ASG at that time. Thus, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the Philippine Navy and the Philippine National Police Maritime Group did not regard the M/V Doulous incident as an act of maritime terrorism – something that is reflective of limited intelligence gathering capability of Philippine law enforcement agencies. It was only after the Super Ferry 14 bombing when Philippine authorities finally realized that the ASG has indeed the capability to wage maritime terrorism.

Based on the classified interrogation of Gamal Baharan, a recently convicted ASG member involved in the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings, some ASG members decisively took scuba diving lessons in southwestern Palawan as part of a plot for an attack at sea. Baharan also said that the late ASG Amir Khadafy Janjalani and the late ASG spokesman Abu Solaiman were in charge of the said maritime terrorist training.

After the Super Ferry 14 bombing, Abu Soliaman taunted the Philippine government in radio interview by saying: “Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people.”

Now that we know that ASG has the capability to mount maritime terrorist attacks, does the group has the intent to mount such kind of attack again the future?

I have reasons to believe so.

First, ASG members continue to operate at sea. The kidnapping of two Chinese-Malaysian workers from a seaweed farm in Semporna, Sabah, Malaysia by ASG members on 8 February 2010 was a demonstration that the ASG continues to operate in the maritime domain.

Second, the ASG, despite its diminished strength due to intensive counter-terrorist operations, remains very active and retains sufficient capability to mount maritime terrorist attacks as some its members who have been trained to undergo underwater operations are still at large.

Third, the ASG has established links with other threat groups with seaborne units. These groups do not only share common remorse against the Philippines government. They also share skills and information to carry out future terrorist attacks.

It is just a matter of time when the ASG will mount maritime terrorist attack again. This is something our law enforcement authorities should prevent to happen in the future

Like other terrorist groups in the world, the ASG is just waiting for the right opportunity to attack its target. Transportation facilities and critical infrastructures in the maritime domain are some of their identified targets.

The urgent task of Philippine law enforcement authorities is to continue denying the ASG and other threat groups in the country the opportunity to carry out their malevolent plans. Otherwise, the Philippines is doomed to suffer another maritime terrorist attack as the ASG continues to have the intent and capability to do so.

Originally published in The Lobbyist, 19 February 2011 at http://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/open-secret

2005 Valentine’s Day Bombing: Lessons Learned Six Years After

Rommel Banlaoi — Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:05:03 +0000

Rommel Banlaoi

Six years ago on the eve of Valentine’s Day in 2005, three separate but successive explosions occurred in busy cities of Makati, Davao and General Santos. Otherwise known as the Philippines’s mini-9/11, because of sequential nature of the attacks, the Valentine’s Day bombings coincided with the birthday of Kris Aquino, a movie actress and the youngest sister of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III.

The Makati City blast resulted in the death of 4 persons and wounding of 60 others. The Davao City and Davao City bombings, on the other hand, caused the death of another 4 persons and injury of at least 30 others.

Only 3o minutes after the Makati City bombing, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) through its spokesperson, Abu Sulaiman, claimed responsibility for these attacks as “Valentines gifts” to then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The ASG also regarded the three bombings as retaliations “to continued government atrocities” against Muslims in the Southern Philippines.

Abu Sulaiman, whose real name is Jainal Antel Sali Jr., was already killed in action on January 17, 2007 as a result of Oplan Ultimatum waged by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Oplan Ultimatum also caused the death of then ASG Amir, Khadaffy Janjalani.

On January 26, 2011, just a day after the Makati Bus Bombing, which coincided this time with the birthday of former President Corazon C. Aquino, the Supreme Court convicted to reclusion perpetua (or life sentence) the three ASG members responsible for the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombing in Makati City: Gamal Baharan (alias Tapay), Angelo Trinidad (alias Abu Khalil) and Rohmat Abdurrohim (alias Abu Jackie or Zaky).

What lessons have we learned six years after the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings?

We learned that despite the killing of their leaders and the incarceration of their members, the ASG still has the deep intent and great capability to sow terror not only in Mindanao but also in Metro Manila.

Though the Philippine National Police (PNP) has already removed the ASG from the list of suspects in the January 25 Makati Bus bombing, we are receiving reports that the ASG has already established a sleeper cell in National Capital Region working with the remnants of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) and so-called Special Operation Group (SOG) of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which the MILF itself claims does not exist. The RSIM, the MILF-SOG and the so-called Moro Islamic Liberation Force lost command are the three groups being currently suspected in the January 25 bombing.

The RSIM is known to be an organization of Muslim convert in Luzon sharing a violent extremist ideology with the ASG. In fact, most RSIM members have been integrated into the ASG since RSIM founder, Ahmad Santos, became the so-called Head of the ASG Media Bureau. RSIM, therefore, can be viewed as the ASG’ operational arm in Metro Manila.

The MILF-SOG, on the other hand, is believed to be working closely not only with ASG but with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) personalities operating in the Philippines. JI has operated in the Metro Manila as demonstrated by the Rizal Day bombing in 2000. We are receiving reports that JI continues to maintain a presence in Metro Manila through its local contacts in the city.

In other words, we are learning the hard lesson that law enforcement authorities can effectively kill or put to jail terrorists but not the virulent idea that endorses acts of terrorism.

We need a better and more convincing idea that rejects the veneration of terrorism.

We also learned that the use of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) continues to be the most favored bombing tool of terrorists. The skill to make IED has been shared with other threat groups in the Philippines whether from the Muslim rebel groups or local communist groups. Because the ASG no longer has the monopoly to make a type of IED that exploded during the January 25 Makati bus bombing, identifying the perpetrator and mastermind is a gargantuan challenge for investigators.

But the hardest lesson learned from the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombing, and the subsequent bombings that have occurred in different parts of the country, is the grim reality that terrorist threat in the Philippines is here to stay unless we seriously undertake strong measures to effectively address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

According to the United Nations (UN), the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism include, but not limited to, prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national, and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance. None of these conditions, however, “can excuse or justify acts of terrorism”, says UN.

Despite the threat of terrorism, nothing shall prevent us from celebrating Valentine’s Day this year.

To ensure that there will be no repeat of the 2005 incident, there will be an increased police visibility in major cities of the Philippines because we all deserve a happy Valentine’s Day!

Originally published in The Lobbyist on 14 February 2011 at http://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/open-secret/454-2005-valentines-day-bombing-lessons-learned-six-years-after

Makati City Bus Bombing: Which Group Could Have Done It?

Rommel Banlaoi — Sat, 05 Feb 2011 13:21:32 +0000

By Rommel Banlaoi

A week after the Makati City Bombing on 25 January 2011, law enforcement authorities are still in search of the perpetrator or mastermind of this gruesome incident.

There are those who are quick to pin the bus bombing on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) having already masterminded two major terrorist attacks in Metro Manila: the 2004 Superferry 14 bombing in Manila Bay and the 2005 Valentines Day bombing in Makati City.

Until now, however, the ASG has not claimed responsibility on the recent attack – something that is very unusual for the ASG.

During the 2005 Valentines Day bombing, the ASG claimed responsibility at the day of the attack. During the 2004 Superferry 14 bombing, the ASG also claimed responsibility five days after the attack. No group has claimed responsibility yet on the recent bus bombing in Makati City. But based on the result of the post-blast investigation, an 81 mm mortar shell was used in the blast with a mobile phone as a detonator.

This kind of improvised explosive device (IED) is typically used in several bombings in Mindanao and the ASG is not the only group with the skills to make that bomb. Bombers from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), New People’s Army (NPA), and even Private Armed Groups (PAGs) have the skills to manufacture that kind of IED. It is the most favored IED of Al Khobar Group (AKG), an extortionist group in Central Mindanao whose main targets are bus companies. Foreign military jihadists associated with the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) introduced that kind of IED to the Philippines.

Because of the type of IED used, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is correct to say that all enemies of the state are suspects. Even a politician in Mindanao was being suspected in the bus bombing because of an alleged involvement in a bombing in the city. But the Philippine National Police (ASG) has suspected three groups behind the bombing: the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), the MILF-Special Operation Group, and the a so-called Bangsamoro Islamic Liberation Force.

At this time, we can only speculate on who really did the bus bombing Makati City.

But we are hearing stories from reliable sources on the ground that some children and orphans of the ASG masterminded the Makati bus bombing. Known lawless Moro personalities reportedly financed these ASG children and orphans.

If this is true, then we are witnessing a new generation of young terrorists – an emerging threat group that can be more virulent and lethal than the old ones.

I hope this is not true. Otherwise, a new threat assessment is needed to understand the ramification of this evolving danger.

Originally published at the Lobbyist, 2 February 2011. See http://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/open-secret/417-makati-city-bus-bombing-which-group-could-have-done-it

Terror Threat: Goverment Must Consult Not Insult

Rommel Banlaoi — Mon, 31 Jan 2011 13:46:05 +0000

by Rommel C. Banlaoi

Despite the serious travel advisories from 7 foreign embassies and warning from a local terrorism think-tank that terrorist threats in the Philippines, particularly in Metro Manila, were imminent, the Philippine government downplayed those advisories and questioned the credibility of a think-tank to make warning. The military establishment even denied the clear and present danger of terrorist threat in the city, arguing that the information from which the travel advisories was based was raw and not yet validated.

While the government and the military may have their own reasons for denying the threat, the Makati bus bombing last January 25 aptly demonstrated that the terrorist threat was not imagined but real.

Causing 5 deaths and injuring at least 13 others, the Makati bus bombing occurred because the threat group with the great intent and increasing capabilities to carry out the bombing found the ripe opportunity to carry out their plans.

One fundamental principle in countering terrorism, political violence or even criminal violence is the urgent need not only to understand the intent and capabilities of threat groups but also the necessity to deny them any single opportunity to mount an attack.

While our law enforcement authorities may already have a grasp of the intent and capabilities of all enemies of the state whether from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), New People’s Army (NPA), lawless elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), rogue factions of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) or organized crime groups like the shadowy Al Khobar Group (AKG), Pentagon Gang and the like, knowing exactly when they will attack is extremely difficult as perpetrators of violence operate discreetly, carefully and patiently.

More inclusive

But the Makati bus bombing could have been prevented had the government taken the travel advisories seriously rather than contradict them. Instead of insulting a think tank on its capability to provide terrorist threat assessment, the government could have been more consulting.

The government could have also done some proactive actions not only through intensified intelligence operations in areas identified as targets but also through enhanced collaboration with all security stakeholders that include the local government, the community, the private sector, and the academe.

Gone are the days when the police and the military were the country’s sole security providers

Securing the nation against threat groups is no longer the sole responsibility of the police and the military. Security is also an inherent responsibility of the local government, a corporate social responsibility of the private sector, and an integral aspect of responsible citizenship.

Gone are the days when the police and the military were the country’s sole security providers. Security has become so comprehensive beyond military sector and the security players have expanded beyond the police and military establishments.

To counter terrorist threats and other forms of violence whether political or criminal, the government has to champion the cause of security sector transformation not only in words but also in actions.

It means the government becoming more engaging with other security players from the private sector, local communities, and the academe. Rather than contract their voices, the government should listen and learn from them and make them truly part of an effective democratic governance, which has been proven as a strong antidote to terrorism and violence.

This piece is originally published in Newsbreak, 31 January 2011 at http://www.newsbreak.ph/2011/01/31/terror-threat-gov%e2%80%99t-must-consult-not-insult/

China’s Core Interests in the South China Sea: Implications for Philippine-American Security Alliance

Rommel Banlaoi — Sat, 29 Jan 2011 02:46:12 +0000

Rommel C. Banlaoi

When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared the South China Sea as an integral part of its core interests at the same level with Taiwan and Tibet, the United States (US) quickly responded that the South China Sea is pivotal to regional security and stressed that peace and stability in the contested area is in America’s national interests.

This exchange of policy declarations from the two major powers explicitly validates the long-standing view that the US and China have incessant and real interests in the security situation in the South China Sea. This development also re-emphasizes the divergent position of the US and China on the South China Sea disputes.

The Philippines, being a major claimant in the disputed islands, islets, reefs and shoals in the area, is again torn between two important lovers: the US, as a defense ally, and China, as a “strategic partner” in regional security.

The recently announced positions of US and China on the South China Sea disputes have revived Philippine security predicaments on two fundamental issues in Philippine foreign and security policy: a) How to strategically balance its relations with the two important major powers that wield tremendous influence on Filipino decision-makers; and b) How to operationally protect its security interests in the South China Sea given its limited military capabilities.

As a security ally cemented by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, there is a high expectation in the Philippines that the US will continuously build the defense capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to address its security challenges. But since the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991, US role in building this capability has become minimal and inadequate. In fact, since the complete withdrawal of American troops in 1992, the capability of the AFP has rapidly deteriorated. From one of the finest armed forces in Asia, the AFP has become one of the world’s ill-equipped armed forces. Since the end of the Second World War, the Philippine military has focused its attention on internal security operations.

The AFP’s external defense capability is extremely limited at present. The Philippines has the only in Navy in Asia without a missile capability. The Philippine Navy, which should be at the frontline of Philippine external defense, has no anti-submarine, electronic warfare and mine warfare capabilities. The Philippine Navy does not even have enough assets to hold its presence in the various maritime areas of its archipelago of more than 7,100 islands. Its facilities in the nine occupied areas in the South China Sea are the most modest and in the desperate state of rapid deterioration due to poor maintenance and harsh weather conditions.

Thus, the Philippines, militarily speaking, is the weakest American ally in Asia, a grim reality that that casts doubt on the reliability of the US as a mutual defense partner.

The weak military capability of the Philippines has strongly encouraged China to assert a much bolder position and aggressive posture in the South China Sea, once described as an “American lake” during the cold war but not anymore now as it has no doubt become a China lake. China has made known to the world that the South China Sea is part of its internal waters and has now built growing naval capability to protect these waters and beyond. China already has a firm offshore forward defense strategy that is matched by modern and high-tech naval assets. Though these naval assets are still far below the capabilities of the US, China has the fastest growing military in the world supported by the fastest growing economy.

The inconvenient truth of China’s growth as a comprehensive power is indeed a great challenge to Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. With its limited defense capability, the Philippines has no illusion of military challenging the claim of China and has accepted the fact of American strategic ambiguity in the South China Sea.

Having said these, the Philippines is presently faced with a more pragmatic option to constructively engage China and maintain a peaceful, cordial and positive relations with the traditional Middle Kingdom in Asia. While the Philippines still values its defense alliance with the US, the government in Manila has to hedge with China and even cultivate a better military relationship with China as American support to Philippine armed forces is small, inadequate and below expectations.

If Philippine defense capability is not improved through autonomous effort or stronger military assistance from the US, Manila will eventually succumb to China ‘s growing world influence and pay tribute to the traditional Middle Kingdom of Asia. If the US fails to assist the Philippines in building its security capability in the midst of the renewed tensions in the South China Sea, Philippine defense alliance with the US will just become archetypal, sentimental and devoid of military value.

The author is the Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) and Head of its Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies.

Private Armed Groups: A New Threat to Philippine Security

Rommel Banlaoi — Sun, 23 Jan 2011 16:56:18 +0000

From a mere peace and order concern of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the rapid proliferation of private armed groups (PAGs) in the Philippines has become a serious national security problem of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Department of National Defense (DND) just declared PAGs as one of the greatest concerns to country’s defense and security along with local communist movements and Muslim secessionist movements.

According to the Independent Commission Against Private Armies (ICAPA), formed in the aftermath of the 23 November 2009 massacre of 57 persons in the Maguindanao province of the Southern Philippines, 112 PAGs are identified all over the country. Most of these PAGs are found in the Muslim areas of Mindanao. But the ICAPA does not specify how many.

The ICAPA figure on PAGs is highly conservative. In the Philippines, it is customary for local government officials to have two or more private armed bodyguards. If the Philippines has 79 provinces, 118 cities and 1,495 municipalities, not to mention 287 members of the Philippine House of Representatives, the true number of PAGs in the Philippines could be truly huge. In Maguindanao province alone, almost all of its 36 municipalities have two or more armed groups. In Sulo and Basilan, there is a saying that each household has a gun. This is a very telling indicator of how big the problem of private armed violence in the Philippines really is.

The ICAPA says that some private armies in the Philippines are organized and funded by the government to fight crime and insurgencies. This makes the definition of private armies in the Philippines highly problematic. If some PAGS are government-organized, are they really private armies?

If the 112 PAGs identified by ICAPA refer to the illegally armed private groups maintained by traditional warlords without the sanction of the government, how can they be dismantled if they serve elected officials? Moreover, how can the police and the military run after PAGs, if many of them have more resources and stronger fire powers than local law enforcement?

The problem of private armed violence in the Philippines has indeed become a security threat because it exacerbates already existing security threats from a shifting network of local communist and Moro secessionist insurgencies. When they are not fighting each other for political and personal reasons, they are likely as not conniving with each other to commit crimes such as arms smuggling, drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnap-for-ransom for financial reasons.

From a human security perspective, private armed violence threatens the welfare of local populations, as was the case in the November 2009 Maguindanao massacre, in which 57 people were killed including the wife, sister, and aids of opposition candidate Esmael Mangudadatu, several innocent by-standers, and at least 34 journalists. PAGs also perpetuate the practice of settling private problems and local disputes through the use of armed confrontation. This practice aggravates an already weak rule-of-law, creates semi-anarchy in the community, and undermines human rights by creating a politics of fear and intimidation in the day-to-day lives of many people in the Philippines. This situation is a vicious circle – the PAGs are, in part, a response to weak central government services in many under-developed localities, but the atmosphere of fear they create discourages the very foreign and local entrepreneurs from investing in the areas where they are needed most in order to propel local economic development, create jobs and reduce poverty. In the view of such potential investors, the high cost for personal and infrastructure security far outbalances any potential profit.

Private armed violence exists because of a weak state that fails to insulate itself from the parochial interests of clans and families maintaining their own private armies. PAGs proliferate because some corrupt key military, police and elected government officials are beholden to local warlords. The result has been the evolution of a complex network that will be extremely difficult to dismantle in a society torn by complex internal armed conflicts.

Identifying and addressing the underlying causes and conditions of internal armed conflicts in the Philippines is a key first step to deal with private armed violence in the Philippines. In a weak state, the task is truly gargantuan but doable and must be tackled. The urgent task is to seriously pursue security sector reform – a task easier said than done but one that must be undertaken.

(This article was originally published at Asian Conflicts Report, July 2010)